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INTRODUCTION 
!  would  like  to  thank  Mr.  Gene  Moos,  President of the National 
Association of Wheat  Growers,  Mr.  Jerry Rees,  his  dynamic  Vice-
President,  and  the members  of the National Association  of Wheat 
Growers  for giving  a  representative of the European  Economic 
Community  an  opportunity  to  address  its convention  in  Denver. 
Relations  between  the  United States  and  the  European  Economic 
Community,  in view of the difficulties of the  American balance 
of payments  and of  the  enlargement negotiations of the  EEC,  have 
been  a  major  focus  of attention during  1971. 
The  December  monetary  accords  in Washington  have  not brought  an 
end  to  discussions  relative to  trade between  the United States 
and  the European  Community  and  particularly to  the positions 
taken  concerning  the  real  and  supposed effects of the  common 
agricultural  policy on  U.S.  agricultural exports. 
The  common  agricultural policy is seen  by  many  Americans  as 
an  "apple  of  discord"  between  the  Uni·ted States  an&  the European 
Economic  Community.  Reflection  and  objectivity must  be  exercised 
on  both  sides of  the Atlantic  in order  to  arrive at  a  better 
comprehension  of  the interests at hand. 
But it is necessary also  to  use  some  imagination  in cooperating 
in  the  search  for  solutions  compatible  with  the  agricultural 
policies of both parties  and with  the  fundamental  conditions 
of agricultural markets  around  the world. 
Utilizing my  past experience with  the  Kennedy  Round  and  my 
daily confrontation with both  American  and  European  preoccu-
pations,  I  would  like to make  some  personal  reflections  today 
which  may  prove  useful  in helping to find mutually acceptable 
solutions.With  this  end  in mind,  it is necessary  for  me  : 
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- first,  to  examine  quickly  the  agricultural policies of the 
European  Community  and of the United States  in order  to  show 
how,  in both cases,  the  formulation  of the best possible 
agricultural policy is  a  difficult task. 
- then,  to  try  to  show  that  finding solutions  for  the pre-
occupations  expressed  in  the  United States  as  well  as  in 
Europe  demands  comn1itments  on  the  very  contents of the  agri-
cultural policies  and  translation  into international 
commodity  agreements. 
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THE  DEr4ANDS  OF  TRADE  Ar~D  'l'HE  SITUA'riON 
QF  IN'I'ERN{\TIONAJ  ..  Ml\.RKETS  l''OR  AGRICUIJTURAL  PRODUCTS  ARE  REAL,  IN 
EUROPE  \S  IN  rnni:  UNITED  S'l'NrES 
A.  It should be  stressed that  the  _<;::cnnmon  agricultu~l policy  does  not 
merit all of  the  criticism it receives  : 
1.  It is easy  to  show  the  importance  of  agriculture  in  the 
European  Community  while  recalling that in  1969,  Community 
farm workers  totaled  10  million as  compared  to  4  million 
in  t~e United States.  At  that  time,  farmers  comprised  14.2  % 
of  the  total  Community  population,  but only  4.8  % in  the 
United States.  Agriculture  _rEpresented  6. 2  % of the  Community 
gross  national  product  in  1968,  as  compared  to  2.9  % of the 
United States'  G.N.P. 
For  the majority of  European  farmers,  agriculture is not only 
a  means  of earning  a  living,  but it is  a  way  of life to  which 
they  remain  very  attached. 
Even  in the United States,  the  human  and  economic  interest in 
maintaining  the  family  farm  is  recognized.  The  new  Secretary 
of Agriculture,  Mr.  Butz,  before  the  House  Agriculture  Committee, 
decla~ed himself  to  be  in  favor  of  family  farms,  providing  they 
have  sufficient flexibility  to  adapt  to  the  conditions  of the 
modern  economy  and  to  secure  an  acceptable  profit for  the  farmer 
and  his  family. 
European  farmers  ask  for  no  more,  and  that is  also  the  objective 
of  the  governments  of  the  Member  States  and of the  institutions 
of  the  Corr~unity. 
2.  It must  be  understood that  the  Community  cannot  renounce  the 
principles  fundamental  to  the  common  agricultural policy. 
Among  its fundamental  principles  are  the  Community  preference 
and~financial solidarity,  both of which  are  absolutely essential 
the 
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for  the  integration of the different agricultural  systems 
German,  French,  Italian,  Bene1.ux,  ana  tomorrow,  British 
and Scandinavian -- into  a  singl~ market. 
In  a  country  such  as  the  United States where  the  Buy  American 
Act  gives  an  advantage  to  American  products  in all kinds  of 
govarnment  procurement,  even if the American  price is  50  % 
higher  than  the  price of  foreign  products  in  the  case  of 
defense  contracts,  it is  easy  to understand  Community  pre-
ference. 
As  for  financial  solidarity, it corresponds  to  inclusion in 
the  federal  budget of the  United States,  that is,  funding  by 
all of the fuuerican  taxpayers,  of agricultural subsidies,  the 
volume  of which  naturally varies  according  to  state. 
3.  Another  important element of the  common  agricultural  policy 
is  the variable import levy  system. 
The  variable levies  are  intended to protect the  level of 
internal prices while preventing products  purchased exter-
nally from  being  imported at price levsls  lower  than  those  judged 
necessary  for  domestic  production. 
The  protection of internal price  levels is one  of  the essential 
objectives of all agricultural policies,  and  only  the  means 
differ  from  country  to  country,  certain countries  preferring 
to use  import quotas. 
It is often  forgotten  that  the  introduction of variable  levies 
in  the  Community  for  the most  impor~ant products  such  as  grains, 
has  brought  about  the  disappearance of quantitative restrictions 
which,  in certain Member  States,  used  to  arbitrarily limit trade 
flows.  Furthermore,  the  collection of variable  levies  on  imports 
has  positive aspects  with  regard  to  competition,  for it neutralizes 
any  attempt  to penetrate  the market  by  using  abnormally  low  prices. 
Thus,  variable  import  levies  assure  the  uni~ormity of the  import 
conditions  in  the European  Community,  no  matter  the point of 
entry into  Communi·ty  territory. 
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However,  the situation has  become  complicated during  the past 
two  years  since  the  changing of certain monetary parities and 
with  the  introduction of  floating  exchange  rates.  The  Comrnun.:!.. ty 
has  had  to  impose  countervailing duties  in  addition to variable 
levies,  among  the  Member  States  as  well,  in order  to  maintai11  the 
uniformity of  the  conditions of access  to  the  Comrnuni ty  and  the 
free  circulat.ion of agricul  t.ural  products  among  Member  States. 
The  most  recent  import measures  have,  then,  no  discriminatory 
character regarding  any  one  trading partner,  but constitute 
only one  example  of  the  application of  the  fundamental  prin-
ciples of the  common  agricultural  policy.  Moreover,  the variable 
import  levies  are  not applied  to all products,  but only  to  the 
most  important ones. 
4.  In the United States,  the  high  prices  for  certain agricultural 
products  in  the  Community  are  often criticized.  The  effort 
made  in recent years  to  limit their increase  is underestimated. 
The  European  Community \villingly  recognizes  that cereal prices, 
for.  example,  were  determined originally much  more  on  the basis 
of political considerations,  that is,  by  the necessity of 
arriving at an  accord  among  the  Member  States,  than  as  a  function 
of their economic  rationale. 
One  must  not  forget,  however,  the  concessions  made  by  agricul-
tural producers  of  the Federal  Republic  of Germany  when  the 
common  prices were  first set  in  1966. 
Since  then  and  until March  1971,  the  prices of agricultural 
products  have  remained  unchanged  in  nominal  value,  which  re-
presents  a  decrease  in  ~eal value  in view of rising costs of 
production. 
Since  the monetary  readjustments  in France  and  Germany  during 
1969,  French  producers  have  not benefitted  from  all of the 
upward  readjustments  of agricultural prices  made  possible  by 
the  devaluation  of the  franc  in  relation  to  the  unit of account 
of the  common  agricultural  policy;  and  German  farmers  have  seen 
the prices of  their agricultural  products  lowered  by  the  re-
valuation of  the  Deutche  mark. 
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The  Governments  of the  Member  States  and  the  institutions of 
the  Community  are  confronted at this  moment  with  a  demand  of 
revalorization of the prices of agricultural  products  based 
on  the  evolution of production costs,  the  constant rise of 
which  has  unacceptably  reduced agricultural  income.  This 
situation has  accelerated the  rural exodus  which,  in  the 
Co~munity, will affect  some  500,000  people  per year. 
It is however  important  to  note  .that  the  Community  is in the 
process of modifying progressively the method  of fixing agri-
cultural prices,  basing itself,  in the  future,  on  the best 
run  and  most efficient  farms.  For  the  least competitive 
farmers,  and  notabdy  for  farmers  between  the  ages  of  45  and 
55  and  who  would  agree  to retire after age  55,  direct aid 
grants  could be  ultimately envisioned.  Moreover,  price 
policy is  aimed at encouraging  a  transfer of activity toward 
animal  production at the  expense  of vegetable  production. 
5.  The  Community  is already  engaged in an  important  reform of 
agricultural structures. 
The  great architect of the  common  agricultural policy,  Mr. 
Mansholt,  Vice-President of the  Commission  of  the  European  Commu-
nities,  has  for  a  long  time  stressed the  limits of price 
policy  in  assuring satisfactory  income  for  the entire agri-
cultural population.  He  insisted on  a  reform of agricultural 
structures. 
From  1958  to  1969,  the  agricultural  population  decreased  from 
15  million to  10  million  farmers,  but there  are still 6  million 
farms  in  the  Community.  The  average  size of  Community  farms 
is only  11  hectares,  or  about  27  acres,  and  farms  larger than 
50  hectares or  125  acres  represent only  3  % of the total. 
It is sometimes  heard  in  the  United States  that after three 
years of discussion,  not much  progress  has  been  made  in  the 
application of this plan.  This  notion  results  fLom  the  fact 
that  the  importance  of the  reforms  envisioned has  not been 
recognized. 
The  Mansholt  Plan  is  aimed at reducing  the  agricultural  popu-
lation of  10  million  to  3  or  4  million people  in  about  ten 
years,  and  the  total acreage  under  cultivation by  12.4  million 
acres,  or  about  6  % of  the present  acreage  over  the  same  period  • 
. . . I  0  •• 
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Mr.  Mansholt is seeking also  to  i~crease the  size of existing 
farms  without  however  unduly  increasing total production. 
Jl,mong  the  measures  envisioned for  the  implementat.ion  of this 
program,  one  must  distinguish between  the  following  categories 
measures  in  favor of  farmers  who  wish  to  retire  from  agricul-
tural activity,  selective grants  for  those  who  will  be  able 
to modernize  their  farms  and  become  competitive,  grants  to 
groups  of producers  who  apply  restraints  in production  and 
marketing,  and  the  vocational  training of  the  sons of farmers. 
The  financial  contribution of  the  Community  will be  25  % of 
the total expenses  for  actions  undertaken  on  the Community 
level.  This  contribution is expected  to  rise  to  65  % in  the 
least competitive  areas. 
The  Mansholt  Plan,  debated  in  governmental  circles,  in agri-
cultural organizations,and by  the  public,  has  led to  an  un-
precedented  awareness  of  the magnitude  and  the  complexity of 
the  agricultural problem.  One  is  now  convinced that no  reform 
is possible  for  agriculture without the  consent of the  inter-
ested parties.  It is apparent  also that such  a  reform could 
not  succeed if it were  not accompanied simultaneously  by  the 
creation of  jobs  industry and services,  by  a  regional  develop-
ment policy,  by  a  social policy,  and  by  considerations relative 
to  the  environment  and  to soil conservation. 
The  first decisions  implementing  the  Mansholt Plan were  made  by 
the Council  of Ministers  in March  1971,  but one  should not 
underestimate  autonomous  actions  by  the Member  States which 
precede  or  are  inspired by  the  contents of the Mansholt  Plan. 
6.  The  risk of creating surpluses  through  the  common  agricultural 
policy is often  emphasized externally as  well  as  internally. 
The  preferred example  was  that of the  accumulation  of  "mountains 
of butter" but  the  experience  showed  that this  situation was 
only  temporary;  today,  the  dairy  surplus  has  totally disappeared. 
As  for  cereals,  the  acreage  under  cultivation has  not increased, 
and  the  growth of production  is  due  exclusively to  the  improved 
yields. 
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It is  important  to  keep  in mind that at the  present  time, 
direct control of production still presents  great difficulties 
in  the  Conununity.  The  introduction of production quotas  would 
have  the effect of freezing  the  present situation and of 
opposing specialization of production  in  the  different  regions 
of  the  E.E.C. 
A  good  example of the  risks  taken is  given  by  the  sugar policy. 
The  introduction of production quotas  for  the  cultivation of 
sugar beets  led to  the setting of quotas  for  each of the  Member 
States which  on  the whole  have  permitted an  increasG of the 
to·tal  production of the  Community. 
Moreover,  the  enormous  number  of small  farms  makes  it difficult 
to  introduce  in Europe  a  policy  comparable  to  the  American 
"set-aside" policy. 
7.  The  Community  feels  that it has  been  very  careful  in its  poli~y 
of export subsidies. 
There  has  been  too  much  emphasis  in the  U.S.  on  the  Taiwan  case 
which  enabled  some  exporters,  by  taking  advantage  of loopholes 
in  the  Community  rules,  to export grains  to  the  detriment of 
American  interests.  But  this  case  was  the  result of an  accident. 
The  Community  has  no  intention of  taking over traditional American 
markets  by  an  aggressive  use  of export subsidies.  It is  ready  to 
give  assurances  on  this point. 
also 
8.  The  Community  feels/that  the  U.S.  is  too  preoccupied with cri-
ticizing the  CAP,  while  refusing to  acknowledge  what  good  markets 
it enjoys  for  its agricultural  exports. 
From  1960  to  1970,  the  U.S.  had  a  trade supplus  with  the  Co1nmunity, 
averaging  2  billion dollars  a  year  and  this  surplus  reached $2.4 
billion in  1970,  for total agricultural  and  industrial  trade with 
Europe. 
This  trade  surplus  toward  the  Coinmunity  is of particular importance 
in  view of  the  concern  shown  by  the u.s.  Government  about  the 
balanGe  of payments of this  country. 
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From July  1970  through  June  1971,  American  agricultural  exports 
amounted  to  7.8 billion dollars,  setting  a  new  record andre-
presenting  a  15  % increase  over  the previous  year.  In  fiscal 
year  1971  as  compared  to fiscal  1970;  these  exports  to  Japan 
increased by  11.5  % while exports  to  the  E.E.C.  increased  27  %. 
Total  agricultural exports  to  Europe  during  the  same  period 
rose  from  1.4 billion dollars  to  1.8 billion dollars. 
It is interesting to note  that these  exports  toward  the  Community 
of variable-levy commodities  have  increased more  than  the  non-variable 
levy  co~~odities, rising  from  one  fiscal year  to  Lhe  next 
from  351  to  480  million dollars.  Wheat  exports  rose  from  42 
to  82  million dollars  and  feed  grains  exports  went  from  248  to 
348  million dollars.  Exports of oilseeds  and  soya  products  rose 
to  760  million dollars  in fiscal year  1970-1971. 
It is necessary  that  the  United States  recognize  that the  E.E.C. 
cannot  import  simultaneously grains,  feedstuffs,  soybeans,  n1eat, 
and poultry,  that is,  both  raw  and  processed commodities.  Like-
wise,  regarding  raw  commodities,  American  exporters  and  the U.S. 
Government  must  adnlit  that commodities  serving  the  same  purpose 
in the  Community  like  feedgrains,  soybeans  and  feedstuffs,  com-
pete against each other.  Therefore,  the outlets  for  individual 
commodities  may  fluctuate  from  year  to  year while  the overall 
value  of  imports  of these  products  continues  to  increase,  demon-
strating once  again  the  importance  of the  Community  market  for 
American  agricultural producers. 10
B.  If one  considers  the  situation of  American  farme:~;:s  and  the 
agricultural policy of  the  United States,  one  finds  much  in  co1runon 
with  the  conuno  n  __  1_a_.g  .....  r_1._· _c_u_l_t_u_ll._-_a_l___..p._o_  ...  _, _i_c_..y_o_f_t_h_e_E_"_._E_._c . 
1.  Just as  European  producers  do,  American  farmers  complain  about 
the  inadequacy of  their  income.  Discussions  concerning  the  level 
of support prices  in relation to parity prices during  the 
recent  period are  a  striking example  of  this. 
European  farmers  noticed also  the  protests of their American 
counterparts against decreases  in  the  October  1971  selling price 
of  wheat  as  compared  to  the  October  1970  prices--and they 
protested even  more  against the  drop  in corn prices. 
Europeans  are attentively  following  the  development of  the 
operations  of  the  Commodity  Credit Corporation,  the  plans 
aimed  at raising price support  by  means  of  so-called strategic 
stockpiles of wheat  and  feed  grains,  and,  especially,  the 
proposal  for  a  25-per-cent  increase  in  the  support price of  corn. 
Happily,  Cornn1unity  farmers  have  not  yet  had  the  idea of  asking 
for  a  25-per-cent  increase  in their guaranteed prices  for 
wheat  or  corn  ! 
European 
2.  The  prices of/cereals  may  appear  high  to  American  producers,  but 
American  milk prices  are  higher  than  those  in  the  Community. 
The  support price of  milk  increased  by  48  per cent between  1964 
and  1970  in  the  United States but  only  by  5  per cent in  the 
Conununi ty during  the  same  period.  'l'he  support price of milk 
has  just been  set at $10.27  per  100  kg  in  the  United States, 
higher  than  the  Common  Market  guaranteed price of $9.85  per 
100  kg. 
As  far  as  American  sugar  producers  are  concerned,  guaranteed 
prices  in  June  1971  were  8.4  cents  a  pound  or  nearly double 
the  world  market  price at that  time. 
I  do  not  mean  to  say  that milk  and  sugar prices  are  too  high 
in  the  United  States  ;  I  simply  want  to emphasize  that the 
European  Economic  Community  does  not  have  a  monopoly  on  high 
agricultural prices. 
Perhaps  we  should  admit,  in  Europe  as  well  as  in  the  United 
States,  that not  only  do  agricultural prices  respond  t0  economic 
conditions but  also to political and  social  imperatives which 
do  not  always  permit  adoption  of  the  most  rational policy. 
• • •  I  e  e  • 3.  It is surprising to  find  that  in  a  country  whose  agriculture 
is as  modernized  and  rationalized as  is the  United  States: 
conflicts similar to  those  existing in Europe  are  found. 
The  fu~erican critics of the C.A.P.  often  point out  that  the 
price policy  followed  until  now  by  the  Conununi ty offers 
exaggerated profi·ts  to the  mos·t  modern  farming  units without 
guaranteeing  a  satisfactory  income  to  the  very  small  farms. 
The  Community,  while  pointing out that the  C.A.P.  is only  a 
few  years  old,  is more  and  more  convinced  of  the  limitations 
of  a  policy of high prices  and  of  the  inequities which  it may 
cause. 
However,  when  one  hears  that  in  1970  out of  2.9 million  farms, 
in this  country,  226,000  or  8  % receive  55  % of  the  income  from 
sales of agricultural commodities,  one  wonders  whether  ·the 
situation is very different in  the  U.S. 
Also,  I  would  like to refer briefly to the  impact  on  American 
agricultural  incomes  of  the  set-aside policy which  enables  the 
biggest  farming  units,  those  which  can set aside  land,  to 
receive  subsidies. 
In  the  U.S.  as  well  as  in  Europe,  one  hears  discussions  of 
the  family  farm  versus  agribusiness.  One  hears  too  in  the  u.s. 
that the  efficiency of big  farms  over traditional  farms  is 
debatable if it results  in  lower-quality products.  For  example, 
it is claimed that the quality of  tomatoes  has  declined  in  the 
U.S.  because  machines  can  pick only hard-skinned  tomatoes. 
Therefore,  there  are  a  growing  number  of  American  farmers  who 
think,  as  the  European  farmers  do,  that  in  order  to determine 
the  adequate  level of agricultural prices,  and  the  location 
and  type  of production,  it is not  sufficient to  apply only 
the criteria of efficiency and  profit in  terms  of  industrial 
businesses. 
4.  It is also  important  to note  that  U.S.  agricultural policy 
is not  a  policy  favorable  to free  trade  for  all products.  Like 
any  other agricultural policy,  it has  its strong points  and  its 
weak  points. 
Since  1955,  the  U.S.  has  enjoyed  a  waiver  to  the  G.A.T.T. 
rules  on  quantitative restrictions  on  imports,  a  situation 
which  is no  longer  justified. 
The  u.s.,  while  urging  the  opening of  foreign  markets  to its 
grain  exports,  practically excludes  dairy product  imports  from 
its own  market.  It has  been  noted  in  the  G.A.T.T.  that these 
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quantitative restrictions are  so effective that,  from  1968  to 
1970  imports of dairy products  into the  United  States  have  been 
equivalent to only  1.5  to  1.7 percent of u.s.  dairy production. 
It is feared  that the political strengtl1of  the American  dairy 
industry may  worsen  the  present situation. 
The  Co~~unity has  offered,  so  far without  success,  to respect 
a  certain minimum  price  level  when  exporting cheese  to  the 
American  market  so  as  not  to interfere with  the  American  milk 
support poljcy. 
The  members  of  the National Association  of  Wheat  Growers  know 
very well that the  U.S.  policy of  import  quotas  is not limited 
to dairy products. 
5.  When  criticizing the protection  and  the  financial  support 
offered to  Community  producers,  there is  a  tendancy  in  the 
u.s.  to overlook  the protection  and  the  support  given  to its 
own  agriculture. 
The  E.E.C.  had  a  comparative  study  made  of agricultural support 
in the  U.S.  and  in  Europe.  If all forms  of  support were 
elimina~ed on  both sides of  the Atlantic,  the results would  be 
a  44  % decrease  in  income  for  the American  farmer  and  a  50  % 
decrease  for  the  Community  farmer. 
per 
Actually,  support/producer would  be  higher  in  the  u.s.  where 
it averages  $1300,  whereas  in Europe it is only $900. 
Such  figures  can  always  be  challenged but  the  magnitude  is 
nevertheless  significant. 
6.  Partners  of  the  United  States are  sometimes  concerned  by  the 
importance  placed  on  the  role of agricultural exports  in  the 
u.s.  trade balance  and  the balance  of  payments. 
The  set-aside policy  produced  unexpected results during  the 
last crop year,  if measured  by  the  increase  in  acreage  under 
cultivation,the size of  the  wheat  and  corn  crops  and  the  amount 
of  carryover.  These  surplus  crops  may  put considerable pressure 
on  international markets. 
Moreover,  the  goals  defined  for  agricultural exports  are  a 
matter of concern.  During  FY  1970-71,  the  U.S.  has  set  a  new 
export  record of  7.8 billion dollars,  but  from different  sources 
one  sometimes  hears  that everything must  be  done  to  reach  a 
10-billion dollar  level of agricultural exports. 
One  may  ask what  are  the  products  the u.s.  plans  to  export 
to obtain,  even  afterseveral years  such  a  resul~what are  the 
solvent markets  to which  they  can  develop  their exports  and 
what  commercial  policy does  the  U.S.  intend to  follow  to 
achieve  such  a  goal. 
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The  u.s.  is not  and  cannot  be  the only exporter of agrir.ultural 
commodities.  Other countries  compete  with  the  u.s.  on  the 
E.E.c.  market. ·Competitors  include  both  industrial countries 
and  developing countries.  The  devaluation of  the dollar in 
relation to European  currencies  is going  t•)  make  it more 
difficult for  the other exporting countries  to  compete  against 
u.s.  exports of  non~variable levy  co~~odities. 
Let  us  hope  that the  exporting countries  do  not  develop 
policies of currency devaluations  to  regain their competitive 
position  on  the  import markets. 
In  this respect,  the  u.s.  and  the  Community  should  pay  more. 
and  more  attention to the  interdependence of agricultural  and 
commercial  policies  and  to  the  community  of  interests 
resulting therefrom. 
. ..  I ... 14
II.  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  EUROPE  SHOULD  BE  ABLE  TO  RFCONC!LE  THE 
- --.  - -
PARTICUIJARS  AND  THE  REOUIREJ'v!ENTS  OF  THFIR  Ar:RICULTUP.AL  POLICIES 
AND  '.rHF.IR  OBlJECTIVES  FOR  TRADE  IN  1\.GRICULTURAL  PRODUCTS  BY  NEGO- - --- --. 
Til\TING  A  NEW  TYPE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  COJvll''lODITY  AGREEM.BNT. 
A.  There will  be  no  possible cooneration  an~ conseauentlv  no  re3l 
solution to the agr_icultural  di~ficulties between  the  United 
States and the  Corrununity  wi.thout  a  qlobal  apProach,  taking 
into consideration the  Present agricultural policies of  the 
Principal producing and  exportinq countries  and  the objectives 
to be  reached on  the  world market. 
1.  It is most  important  to  be  convinced  of  the  limits of an  aggressive 
export policy  founded  on  the  lowest  possible prices  to penetrate 
new  markets. 
The  first limits of  such  a  policy can  come  from  agricultural 
producers  themselves  who  will  judge that the  export price  levels 
do  not  assure  them  satisfactory pavment.  In reality,  within  a 
given  country,  an  export nolicv  founde~ on  verv  low Prices 
quickly results  in  a  divergence of producers'  an~ tra1ers' 
interests.  Such a policy is certainly easier to practice  in  a 
country where  representation of commercial  interests in  the 
decision-making  bodies  counterbalances  or outweiqhs  the 
representation of agrictlltural  pro~ucers themselves. 
Such  a  low-price  policv is onlv Partiallv justified hv  consi~erations 
of  consumer  protection.  The  expenses  in  the  familv  hudqet 
are quite different in  1971  from  what  they  were  in  the  recent 
past.  The  share of basic agricultural Products  is smaller and 
smaller if one  comt;>ares  it either to  the  cost  of  Processinq, 
preparing,  and  advertising  thA  Products  ~elivered to  the 
consumer  ,  or to other  tvpes  of  exPenses  in  the  bu~aet. 
Moreover,  the  industrialized countries with  extensivelv 
developed agricultural  sectors  which  defen~ the  lowest 
possible agricultural  exnort  price~ can  harm  developing 
countries  whose  export resources  are  not  as  diversified and 
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who  complain bitterly about  constant deterioration of the 
terms  of exchange  and  the  decrease of their export  income. 
Finally,  this  low-price  export policy is of little interest 
for  the  countries  which  export  to  the  Community  as  the  latter 
protects its internal  price  levels  by  variable  import  levies 
offsetting any  downward  fluctuation  in pseudo-world market 
prices. 
2.  For  the  most  important agricultural  products,  it is  no  longer 
possible  to arrive at satisfactory settlements  in  a  bilateral 
framework. 
Relations  between  the  United States  and  the  Community  have 
provided many  examples  of the  insufficiency of bilateralism 
in  the  case where  several  countries  agree  to grant export 
subsidies on  a  specific market.  Countries  that develop their 
production of agricultural products  are  numerous.  As  a  result, 
there is a  limited number  of solvable  import markets,  and 
competition  for  exports  is accentuated. 
The  agreement  which  the  United States  and  the  European  Community 
will certainly reach very  soon  concerns  the  policy of wheat 
stockpiling.  This  agreement is  an  indication of the  good 
will of  the American  and  European partners.  But it is  evident 
that the  scope  of  such  an  agreement  is bound  to be  limited if, 
at the  same  time,  the  other wheat producing  and  exporting 
countries  do  not  impose  the  same  constraints but,  to  the 
contrary,  seek to profit from  the policy followed  by  the 
United States  and  Europe. 
3.  It is not possible either to solve  the problems  of inter-
national agricultural  trade without  taking  into consideration 
the content of  the agricultural policies  themselves  -- that 
is,  production policy  and  price  policy -- together with 
commercial  policy  and  the  instruments  of  commercial  policy 
in agriculture. 
Experience  in  G.A.T.T.  over  the years  should have  convinced 
us  that most  countries  have  developed very  complex  agricul-
tural policies,  characterized by  governmental  intervention 
to  protect the  farmers  and  that agricultural  support is 
generalized. 
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Often,  a  country cannot  agree to negotiations  denlinq only 
with  a  single aspect of its import policv,  hecause  this 
mLght  unbalance its entire agricultural policv.  On  the other 
hand,  the negotiation of  a  single  instrumf'mt  may  turn  into 
a  fruitless  exercise  for  an  exoorter if 'che  instrument 
is only  a  secondary element  of  ~he import  regulations. 
Future agricultural negotiations,  therefore,  in order to  be 
possible and  effective~  must  deal with  the  content of these 
policies,  the  nature  and  the  amount  of  the  support  given  to 
the producers,  and  all the  instruments  which  ensure this 
support. 
4.  An  agricultural negotiation must  also take into account  the 
dimension  and  the  characteristics  of what  is conventionally 
and  too often called the world market. 
The  world  market  is  a  myth if by  this one  means  a  market 
in which  the  law  of supply  and  demand  operates  freely. 
The  world market,  or  rather  the  various  agricultural markets 
which  comprise  the  world market,  is  a  place  where  a  balance 
of power  and  price-fixing  too  often  depend  upon  the  existence 
or  non-existence of surpluses  and  upon  the  amount  of 
export  subsidies available  in  the  exporting countries. 
The  U.S.  and  the  Community  should  recognize  that  free  trade 
is  a  myth  in agriculture,  in  view of the  use  bv  both 
of  support measures  andofthe  intervention aqencies  like 
the  Commodity  Credit Corporation or the  European Agricultural 
Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund. 
Because  the  United States  and  the  Community  have at their 
disposal  financing that is  not available to other countries, 
they  have  an  ever  greater responsibilitv in  the  functioning 
of  ·the  world  market.  The  U.S.  and  the  Community  should, 
for  certain  commodities,  make  a  con~on effort to  Promote 
the  determination of an  adequate  price  level  on  the  world 
market  and  to contribute to  price stabilization.  The  result 
would  be  not  only  the  normalization of  the  conditions of 
competition by  obliging  exporters  to  respect  these  prices, 
but also a  response  to  the  expectations of numerous  developinq 
countries. 
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B ·  Tl':le_  Uni  tee~  Sta  t:.~~s _ann  the  European  Economic Communi tv  shoulct 
conseguentlv cooperate  in  the  draftinq of  anrl_in  the  neqotiation 
of  ~f.!~~iona.l:  c~LI.unodi tv agreements  \vhis;h  re~lect their 
2~'.nit.v of  J.nterests. while offerinq a  framework  within which 
to conciliate those aspects  which  mav  he  ~ivergent. 
1.  It seems  to me  necessary  to  return to  the  proposals of the 
European  Economic  Community  in  the  Kennedy  Round  for  the 
conclusion of international agreements  for  a  large  number 
of agricultural products  such  as  grains  -- and  not  only 
wheat  -- dairy products,  meat,  fats  anct  oils. 
Without  dwelling  too  long  on  lost opportunities  in the 
Kennedy  Round,  some  ideas  advanced at that time  might  inspire 
reflections that would  be  useful  for  future  negotiations. 
The  most  interesting example  is grains. 
The  Community  proposed  simultaneously  l)  to  proceed with 
the negotiation of  a  minimum-price  level to be  resPected in 
international trade  for  each  kind of grain,  2)  to conso-
lidate the  margin  of support  to be  given  hy  each  country 
to agriculture,  ~3)  to  make  a  commitment  on  a  self-sufficiencv 
ratio,  and  finally  4)  to accept  to  include  in  such  an 
international agreement  provisions  for  food  aid. 
The  negotiation of  a  minimum  price  for  grains  sol~ on  the 
world market  appeared  necessary  in order to assure  the 
maintenance  of  an  adequate  level of  payment to the  exporters 
and  to avoid  a  competitive  lowerin9 of prices.  It was 
hoped  that  under  the  future  agreement,  prices would  normally 
remain  above  the  minimum  reference price.  The  Community 
proposed  to negotiate also the quality differentials  to  take 
into account,  for  each  grain,  quality differences  in 
relation  to  the  reference quality chosen  to  he  the  subject 
of the  negotiations  on  the  minimum  price  level. 
The  margin  of  support  represented  the  amount  of  government 
aid given  to  the  commodity  under  consideration.  The  consoli-
dation of  the  margin  of  support  meant,  in  the  case of the 
Community,  that it was  ready  to  freeze  the  difference between 
the  internal grain prices  of  the  E.E.C.  and  the  new  world 
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prices negotiated,  this  freeze  being valid for  a  period of 
three years.  The  Community  accepted thus  not to  raise its 
internal prices  during this  period.  The  consolidation of 
the margin  of support meant also  that the  amount  of subsidy 
given  to  exports  was  henceforth limited by  the  requirement 
of respecting the  level of the  international minimum  prices 
negotiated in  the  agreement.  The  commitment  to  a  policy of 
Community  prices  doubled  thus  in  to  a  com  ..  rni tmen<t  to its 
export subsidies. 
The  negotiation of  a  self-sufficiency ratio completed the 
preceding  agreements.  By  self-sufficiency ratio is meant 
the relationship between  internal production  and  consumption. 
If  the  ratio were  to  increase  in  the future,  resulting in 
an  increase of internal production,  the  Community  committed 
itself to refrain  from offering surpluses  on  the  commercial 
market.  This  was  in fact  an  indirect Community  commitment 
on  production policy.  Such  a  commitment obliged the  Community 
to  increase its stockpiles,  or to  increase its  food  aid,  or, 
eventually,  to  take  autonomous  steps  to  reduce its production. 
2.  The  international agreements  would  permit  an  easier concilia-
tion of  divergent  interests of the u.s.  and  Europian  agri-
culture. 
It is  important  to point'out that  these proposals of the 
E.E.C.  had been  agreed  to  by  the agricultural organizations 
of  the Community  after much  discussion. 
The  sacrifices which  the  Community  farmers  had  accepted at the 
time  of the Kennedy  Round  concerning price policy or the  even-
tual  consequences  of the ratio of self-sufficiency on  production 
policy,  were,  in their opinion,  balanced by  the  possibility of 
obtaining  a  better organization of the world market,  a  price 
level which  would  be  recognized  and  respected  in  international 
trade,  a  confrontation of the  substance of the  various  agri-
cultural policies,  and equitably distributed commitments  for 
support.  International  agreements  facilitate  reciprocity  and 
a  balance  in  the  commi·tments. 
The  notion of self-sufficiency ratio appeared  as  a  kind of 
safeguard against the proliferation of anarchistic production 
policies  and  showed  the  interdependence  of  the  production 
policies. 
Such  ~greements, if they  could have  been  concluded,  would 
have  been  additionally  important because  of their  development  . 
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The  observance of the  co:mrni tments  v1ould  have  promoted 
acceleration of the  structural reforms  J.n  the  various  countries. 
Attention  could have  been  dir8cted progressively  to  the 
coherence  of the  self-sufficiency ratios and  the  volume  of the 
commercial  and  non-conunercial  dernand.  Fooo  ai<'l  could 
have  been  conceived not  as  an  obligation to assume  in 
order to achieve  signature of the  Kennedy  Round,  hut  as 
an  element  of  a  policy of the  industrialized agricultural 
producers  in  support of development  assi~ta~ce. 
3.  From  ~ow on,  considerable effort has  to  be  made  to  nersuarle 
certatn groups  viithin  the American Administration  anr1  wtthin 
certain large U.S.  organizations  that there is a  sound  basis 
for  international commodity agreements. 
Actually,  this  is also true  for  the  Community,  for it is not 
at all certain today  that the producers,  not  to mention 
certain Member  State governments,  would  be  prepared to 
make  commitments  on  price policy of the  type  envisioned in 
the  Kennedy  Round,  which  are  felt to be  too constraining. 
It can  be difficult to  go  back  to certain ideas  advanced  in 
the  Kennedy  Round  without first modifying  them,  such  as  the 
freezing  o~ the prices  for  three  year~.  It would  he  necessary 
to  find  formulas  which  take  into consideration modifications 
of the  general  price index,  the rate of inflation,  allow-
ing  some  flexibility in the  commitments  made  concernina  the  margin 
of  support.  It should  even  be  possible to vary  these 
commitments  according to the  commodities,  the  countries  and 
even  the policies adopted  as  long  as  it is possible to  prove 
that they are equivalent  from  one  country to another. 
In  the  same  way,  it would  be  necessary  to find  a  formula 
giving greater flexibility  to  the  level of the  inter-
national  minimum  prices  fixed  in the  agreements  as  well 
as  to the quality differentials determined  for  each  category 
of products.  Notably,  it is necessary  to  be  able  to adjust 
these  prices  and  these quality differentials  in the  course 
of the  duration  of  the  agreements  if adjustment  proves  neces-
sary,  entrusting these  powers  to  an  ad  hoc  committee 
created in the  framework  of the  agreement,  closely associating 
all interested countries  in  the decision.  The  international 
agreement  in  this area  must  be  an  instrument of Permanent 
cooperation. 
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Commitments  on production policies must certainly be  very 
progressive.  Such  commitments  would  be  easier  t.o  make  if 
they left to the countries  concerned  the resnonsibilitv of 
independently adapting their production  mea3~res  with-resoect 
to the  corn.111i tments  made. 
i.ikewise,  it is desirable that the  agreements  should not  he 
unfform,  the  agreement  on  dairy products  differing in its 
contents  and  form  from  the agreement  on  grains,  anct  the 
agreement  on  meat  being of still another  type.  What  is essen-
tial is  that the  commitments  deal with  the  actual content 
of the policies. 
International  commodity  agreements  must  allow  for  change  and 
must  adapt to circumstances.  To  wish  to organize  the 
international markets  does  not mean  to  formulate  rigid rules 
and  a  narrow  framework  incompatible with  the exnansion 
of trade,  the  dynamism of trading companies,  and  the  constant 
adjustment  to  new  situations. 
also 
4.  Interna·tional  agreements  constitute/the appropriate  framework 
for  cooperation between  the  United States  and  Europe  to 
expand  food  aid to developinq countries. 
In  the  developing countries great  hopes  for  the.increase of 
agricultural production have  been  placed in the  Green 
Revolution.  Spectacular results have  been  obtained in  India, 
which  is not to  say  that even  in that countrv  food  problems 
have  been actually solved. 
In  reality,  the most  recent studies  show  that  improvement of 
a9ricultural production has  only  followed  the  demographic 
advancement.  One  could· calculate that in Brazil,  for  example, 
if the rate of  increase of agricultural productj.on  p~r 
inhabitant were  maintained at its usual  level of 0.7  %,  it 
would  take  100  years  to double  a  food  supply that is 
insufficient today.  In  Egypt,  it would  take  140  years. 
Present rates of  growth  of agricultural production are  even 
declining in Algeria,  Tunisia,  and Morocco. 
Food aid is not  however  a  cure-all and  should certainly not 
constitute an  easy  way  of exporting surpluses.  Rut  the 
United States and  Europe  have  sufficiently diversified 
agricultural production  so that they  can  be  adapted to the 
production of  con~odities which  are most  ne.cessarv  to the 
undernourished countries. 
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The  effect of price stabilization of products  exnorted bv 
developing countries  by  mean::-'  of the negotiation of  a  minimu1n 
price  in  international agreements,  combined  vti th an  impro-
vement  in the present conditions  of  food  aid,  would  he  to 
accelerate the promotion of these  co~~tries to  the rank of 
consumers  of more  and more  diversified agricultural products 
which  cannot be  produced  on  their soil,  thus  beginning 
progessively  a  new  phase  in the expansion of  international 
trade  in agricultural products. 22
CONCLUSION 
In  conclusion,  the u.s.  and  Europe,  whether it be  the  Europe 
of Six  today or,  very  soon,  the  Europe  of Ten,  with  the  entry 
of Great Britain,  Ireland,  Denmark,  and  Norway,  have  many  reasons 
to  seek  the  means  of  a  true  cooperation in agriculture.  On 
both sides,  the  number  of producers  is very  large,  the  economic 
interests at stake very  important,  UJd  the political problem 
cannot be  underestimated. 
The  enlargement of the  EEC  requires,  no  doubt,  a  new  definition 
of the  economic  and  commercial  relations  between  the  U.S.  and 
Europe,  which will result  nota~lY from  a  large scale  negotia-
tion in which  the  EEC  has  already stated it is  ready  to parti-
cipate at the appropriate  time. 
The  negotiations  concerning agriculture will be  an  important 
and sensitive part of these  negotiations  and  consequently, 
require  thorough  preparation. 
The  negotiation of international  commodity  agreements,  adapted 
to  the particular characteristics of the  commodities,  of agri-
cultural policies  and of the markets  for  these  commodities,  is 
desirable because it substitutes dialogue  for brutal confronta-
tion  and  conciliation of interests  for  shows  of strength. 
By  taking  into  account  the  substance of the various  agricultural 
policies,  international  commodity  agreements  would  make  it 
possible to  take  advantage  of the vitality of the  family  farm 
as  well  as  of  the  dynamism of the big enterprises. 
Agreements  would  also  enable  rich  and  industrialized countries, 
by  means  of  a  food  aid program,  to  help in  the  ec0nomic  develop-
ment of those parts of the world which  are  the most  disadvan-
taged. 
European  agriculture  is  going  through  a  complete  transformation, 
but it is enough  to  look at American  policy  to  realize that there 
is no  ready-made  solution  and  that it requires  time.  American 
and  European  farmers  should  readily admit  that they  cannot  thrive 
to  the  detriment of  ea~h other. 
Farmers,  in Europe  as  in  the U.S.,  are  an  important political 
force.  That fact emphasizes  their responsibility,  along with 
the  responsibility of  gov~rnments,  to  develo~ dynamic  cooper-
ation between  the u.s.  and  Europe  in the  agricultural  sector. 